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ABSTRACT
Illegal booter services offer denial of service (DoS) attacks for
a fee of a few tens of dollars a month. Internationally, police
have implemented a range of different types of intervention
aimed at those using and offering booter services, including
arrests and website takedown. In order to measure the im-
pact of these interventions we look at the usage reports that
booters themselves provide and at measurements of reflected
UDP DoS attacks, leveraging a five year measurement dataset
that has been statistically demonstrated to have very high
coverage. We analysed time series data (using a negative
binomial regression model) to show that several interventions
have had a statistically significant impact on the number of
attacks. We show that, while there is no consistent effect of
highly-publicised court cases, takedowns of individual booters
precede significant, but short-lived, reductions in recorded at-
tack numbers. However, more wide-ranging disruptions have
much longer effects. The closure of HackForums’ booter mar-
ket reduced attacks for 13 weeks globally (and for longer in
particular countries) and the FBI’s coordinated operation in
December 2018, which involved both takedowns and arrests,
reduced attacks by a third for at least 10 weeks and resulted
in lasting change to the structure of the booter market.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Networks→Denial-of-service attacks; • Social and
professional topics → Computer crime; • Security and
privacy → Social aspects of security and privacy; • Math-
ematics of computing → Time series analysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
‘Booter’, or ‘stresser’, services provide Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks as-a-service. DoS attacks generate large amounts of
traffic which overwhelm end-users or web services, taking
them offline or making legitimate access impossible [26].
Booter operators advertise customer-facing websites, where
individuals can set up accounts and order attacks [54], with
payments accepted using digital services such as PayPal or
through transfers of cryptocurrency [22, 28]. A range of
different packages and membership options are available,
with $10 to $20 being typical for a month’s worth of DoS
attacks of sufficient size to disrupt an end-user connection or
a website which does not have specialist DoS protection.
Operating a booter service or purchasing a DoS attack
is illegal in most jurisdictions. However, when asked during
research undertaken in 2014, booter operators were uncon-
cerned about the possibility of law enforcement taking action
against them [22]. Nevertheless, a number of police actions
have taken place in recent years, and this research aims
to measure whether there has been any impact on booter
provision and booter usage.
There has been much research into the effects of police
action on offline illicit markets and services, however there
is little understanding of what ‘best practice’ looks like for
cybercrime, which tends to be more geographically dispersed
and organised around online communities and markets which
are particularly resilient [1, 43]. In practice, law enforcement
interventions in online illicit markets are not straightfor-
ward. Displacement is a problem for both online and offline
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markets [23, 44, 63] and participants may seek new ven-
dors or locations following the shutdown of established mar-
kets [58, 59]. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a range
of different kinds of interventions – high profile court cases
and sentencing of booter providers, arrests, takedowns of
booter websites, and messaging campaigns targeted at users.
We measure the impact of interventions using two datasets.
The first is a dataset of victims of reflected UDP amplifi-
cation attacks, a technique widely used by booters, which
covers a five-year period from 2014. This dataset is known
to have good coverage of many widely abused protocols [61].
The second dataset is of self-reported DoS attack numbers
collected from booter websites. It covers 75% or more of ac-
tive booters over the 18-month period in which the majority
of interventions have occurred.
We start (§2) by considering major police interventions
against booter providers and users and then discuss (§3)
the attack datasets we use. We present (§4) our negative
binomial regression model and show several linkages between
interventions and deviations from seasonal trends. We do
further analysis (§4.1) of the data at a country level and show
the impact of a UK-specific advertising campaign. After
reviewing related work (§5), we discuss what makes for an
effective police intervention (§6) and finally draw conclusions
(§7). Ethical considerations are outlined in the Appendix.
2 THE INTERVENTIONS
Law enforcement can respond to cybercrime not only by ar-
resting criminals, but by seeking to prevent people becoming
involved, by disrupting harmful criminal activity, and pro-
tecting those at risk of becoming victims. For example, the
UK Home Office sets out their ‘Pursue, Prevent, and Protect’
approach in their Serious and Organised Crime Strategy [21].
Here, we outline some of the main interventions against
booter services, their providers, and their users in the 2014–
2019 period for which we have DoS attack data. The events
come from an analysis of Brian Krebs’ popular blog [30–38],
but were also widely covered in the press. We have added
one further event (§2.7) which was not widely reported but
was very visible within booter communities.
2.1 LizardStresser
In early 2015, the backend database of users of the Lizard-
Stresser booter service, which had only been in operation for
a few weeks, was leaked. On 28 August 2015 six UK individ-
uals who had purchased attacks were arrested in ‘Operation
Vivarium’. Approximately 50 others who had registered with
the site received a ‘cease and desist’ home visit from UK po-
lice. Although merely registering at a booter is not an offence
in the UK the individuals were told that DoS attacks are
“illegal, can prevent individuals from accessing vital online
services, and can cause significant financial and reputational
damage to businesses” [45].
Only one related court case has been reported. On 22
December 2015 a 17-year-old pleaded guilty to a DoS attack
(and another offence), receiving a 12-month sentence in a
young offenders’ institution. He also had to pay over £1 000
compensation to the DoS victim [46].
On 6 October 2016 two 19-year-olds were arrested in the
US and the Netherlands for allegedly running the Lizard-
Stresser booter service [32]. On 27 March 2018 the American
received a three month prison sentence and was ordered to
pay $350 000 in restitution after pleading guilty and cooper-
ating with authorities [49].
2.2 Netspoof, etc.
On 8 April 2016, a 20-year-old man was sentenced in the UK
after pleading guilty to 6 charges under the Computer Misuse
Act and 4 under the Serious Crime Act. He had operated four
booter services, including one called Netspoof, and received a
2-year youth detention sentence, suspended for 18 months,
100 hours unpaid work and £800 costs [36].
In December 2016, 12 people were arrested for purchasing
DoS attacks on Netspoof, 30 cease and desist notices were
issued, computers were seized from 11 of the suspects, one pro-
tective visit was made, and two cautions were issued [47]. This
was part of a coordinated international action against users of
booter services which took place between 5 and 9 December
2016. It involved Europol as well as law enforcement author-
ities from Australia, Belgium, France, Hungary, Lithuania,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
the UK, and the US. Overall, there were 34 arrests, and 101
suspects were interviewed and cautioned [16].
2.3 HackForums & Mirai
On 28 October 2016, the “Server Stress Testing” (SST)
section of HackForums, a large and long-running English-
language underground forum, was removed, and advertise-
ments for booter services were banned [33]. The proximate
cause of this shuttering was a telephone conversation between
HackForums’ owner and an FBI agent (personal communica-
tion, 2018), but it was the culmination of a series of events.
On 8 September 2016, Brian Krebs posted an article [34]
about a leaked backend database from the vDOS booter,
which contained entries for tens of thousands of users and
more than 150 000 attacks. He claimed the operators made
more than $600000 over two years, and that the service was
operated by two men in Israel, with support from others in the
US. Hours later, the two Israeli men were arrested [30]. This
was followed a DoS attack against Krebs’ website that was
reported as being the largest ever recorded at the time [35].
On 30 September the source code for Mirai, the botnet
responsible for this DoS attack, was released on HackForums,
apparently because the author feared arrest and wanted an
excuse for having a copy of the code. On 21 October, a Mirai
botnet launched an even larger attack against the Internet
infrastructure firm Dyn causing outages for many popular
sites, including Twitter, PayPal, Reddit, and Netflix [31].
The HackForums ban left a gap in the market for advertis-
ing and discussing booters and a few months later stresserfo-
rums.net was set up. There was some displacement to this
new forum, and it had almost 800 members and over 7 000
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posts when it closed in April 2018, around the time of the
Webstresser takedown (detailed below). A number of forums
with the same name have subsequently failed to gain traction.
The Israelis were charged, but it appears the matter is
still proceeding. In the UK, a 19-year-old pleaded guilty to
a number of offences relating to vDOS. On 19 December
2017, he was sentenced to 16 months in a young offenders
institution, suspended for two years, and was ordered to
complete 20 days of rehabilitation activity [56].
On 18 September 2018, three men aged 21 to 22 years were
sentenced for authoring and using the Mirai botnet. They
each received five years probation, 2 500 hours of community
service, and were ordered to pay $127 000 restitution. This
light sentence (for the US) was due to the cooperation of
the defendants in helping the investigation, identifying other
suspects, and assisting industry to combat incidents [37].
On 26 October 2018, one of the men received a further
sentence for using Mirai for DoS attacks against Rutgers
University. He was sentenced to 2500 hours of community
service, six months home confinement, and was ordered to
pay $8.6 million in restitution [38].
2.4 Titaniumstresser
In the UK a 19-year-old received a 24-month sentence on 25
April 2017 (reduced on appeal to 21 months) [2] for operating
the Titaniumstresser booter and personally committing 594
DoS attacks against 181 targets. The service was reportedly
used for 1.7M attacks. His case was also widely reported
on 22 November 2016 when he had pleaded guilty to two
offences under the Computer Misuse Act and one money
laundering offence. At a confiscation hearing in March 2018,
he was ordered to repay £69 629 in compensation or face an
additional two years in prison [20].
2.5 Webstresser
On 24 April 2018 the domain for the Webstresser booter
was seized and its alleged administrators were arrested in the
UK, Croatia, Canada, and Serbia [17]. Europol subsequently
reported that 250 UK users of Webstresser were to receive
police visits or warnings [18] and that users in the Netherlands,
Italy, Spain, Croatia, Australia, Canada, and Hong Kong
would also be “targeted”.
2.6 FBI action: Xmas2018
On 19 December 2018 the FBI announced that they had ar-
rested three booter operators, running DownThem, Ampnode,
and Quantum Stresser and that they had seized 15 domain
names for booter websites [13]. Dataset analysis shows this
immediately took seven booter services offline (the other
domain names were either duplicates for the same service or
the booter was not operational at that time). The timing,
just before Christmas, was intended to disrupt a pattern of
increased DoS activity over the holiday period [8].
2.7 NCA Google search advert warnings
The HackForums ban on adverts for booter services meant
providers had to find other ways of attracting customers. One
booter service purchased Google search adverts (displayed
when people searched for relevant keywords) [9]. However,
advertising can also be used by the police.
From late December 2017 to June 2018 the UK National
Crime Agency (NCA) bought search adverts from Google
which warned young users on UK IP addresses of the illegality
of DoS attacks when they searched for booter-related terms.
As with the in-person warnings delivered in Operation Vivar-
ium, the aim was to divert people away from cybercrime, by
informing them of potential legal consequences.
3 DATASETS
We use two datasets, provided to us by the Cambridge Cy-
bercrime Centre, to measure whether the number of DoS
attacks by booter services is affected by police interventions.
The first dataset is of reflected amplified UDP DoS attacks
in which a small incoming UDP packet generates a much
larger response – and if the source IP of the original packet
is spoofed then substantial amounts of traffic can be directed
at a victim. The dataset is of victim IPs seen by a large
number of honeypot machines roped into attacks using the
protocols QOTD, CHARGEN, time, DNS, PORTMAP, NTP,
LDAP, MSSQL Monitor, MDNS, and SSDP. Full details
of the dataset are provided by Thomas et al. along with a
statistical analysis to show high levels of coverage for many
of these UDP protocols [61]. For analysis we group flows of
packets to the same victim IP or prefix for the same protocol
until there is a gap of at least 15 minutes with no packets
being received by any sensor. We then check to see if any
sensor received more than 5 packets. If so then we deem it
an attack, if not then we classify the event as a scan.
While this dataset counts traffic volume we cannot reliably
translate this into the traffic volume which victims would
experience and so we focus on the number of attacks rather
than their size. The problem is that we do not know how
many real reflectors booters are using and so we are unable
to scale our observed volumes appropriately.
There are limitations to this dataset because not all re-
flected attacks are associated with booters and booters can
perform other types of attack. However, we believe it is
broadly representative of booter activity. The attack logs of
three prominent booters1 from 2014, 2016, and 2017/2018 all
1Of the 285 414 attacks for booter.io recorded between 2014-03-24
and 2014-09-07, 261 968 (91%) are for method names indicating
UDP reflection (UDP, CHARGEN, UDPLAG). Of the 169 845 at-
tacks recorded between 2016-05-01 and 2016-07-23 for vDOS 123 751
(72%) are for method names indicating UDP reflection (DNS, NTP,
SNMP, PORTMAP) [61]. Of the 412 059 attacks recorded for Web-
stresser (§2.5) between 2017-10-18 and 2018-02-26, 339 181 (82%)
were probably UDP reflection attacks based on their name. The UDP
honeypot dataset contains 97% of the LDAP, NTP and PORTMAP
attacks but only 111 306 (33%) of the attacks overall, mostly because
of only 9% coverage for ‘SUDP’. It is hard to know what method
names mean without either performing self attacks [55] or observing
the attacks with sensors. Coverage for named methods that might
be UDP based is: ‘LDAP’ 41 097/42 136 (98%), ‘NTP’ 32 094/33 171
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Figure 1: Timeline of intervention events and the number of reflected UDP DoS attacks per week.
show over 70% of attacks were likely UDP reflection attacks.
Krupp et al. were able to attribute 26% of DNS and 13% of
NTP attacks to specific booters which they had bought at-
tacks from [40]. Noroozian et al. found that over 48% of UDP
reflection attacks and 62% of victims are on IP addresses in
access networks [48], Sharma found that 89% of US, 98% of
UK, 71% of FR, and 89% of DE victims were home users [57].
Sharma also found that over 50% of attacks were less than
5 minutes. This is a pattern of behaviour which we would
expect from booters. Nevertheless there will be other sources
of UDP reflection attacks included within this dataset.
The second dataset comes from the booters themselves
which, presumably to assist in marketing, report a running
total of the attacks they have performed. This data has been
collected on a weekly basis since November 2017.
We know that booters use SQL databases to hold de-
tails of users and attacks because large numbers of these
databases have been leaked. The source of many booters has
also been leaked and we invariably find PHP code such as:
$TotalUsers = $odb->query(“SELECT COUNT(*) FROM
‘users‘”)->fetchColumn(0); $TotalAttacks = $odb->query(
“SELECT COUNT(*) FROM ‘logs‘”)->fetchColumn(0); i.e.
(97%), ‘PORTMAP’ 11 497/11 858 (97%), ‘SUDP’ 21 922/235 905 (9%),
‘UDPKILL’ 3 058/10 507 (29%), and ‘UDPRAND’ 1 638/5 604 (29%).
Of the 72 878 attacks whose names suggest they are not entirely UDP
based (TS3KILL, TS3, VOX, FRAG, ZAP, ICMP, DOMINATE, ACK,
VSE, SYN, COD, RST), we observed 21 598 (30%) with coverage rates
between 20% and 50%.
fetching counts directly from the SQL database, followed by
display code such as <li>Users: <?php echo $TotalUsers; ?>
Attacks: <?php echo $TotalAttacks; ?></li>.
A handful of booters have clearly inflated their counts (one
counted from 150000 rather than zero – trivially done in
the PHP code) and some wipe their databases (and hence
zero their counts) from time to time. One booter reported
values which were regularly multiples of 1000 and we exclude
it. However, we can see no other obvious artificial patterns
within the dataset, but for good measure we performed some
statistical tests on the weekly totals to determine if they
might have been algorithmically generated.
Count data tends to be heteroskedastistic i.e. as numbers
go up the variance in the series will be found to increase
as well. Many of the smaller or shorter booter series show
too high a degree of variance or nonlinearity to perform
meaningful tests for this effect. However, we conducted linear
regression analysis and performed White’s heteroskedasticity
test on those booters where this was valid. We also performed
skewness kurtosis tests for normality on these series, as real-
world data are often normally distributed, and faking with
random data would produce uniform distributions. Our anal-
ysis indicated that the top ten most active booters’ attack
series were normally distributed or heteroskedastistic (with
most being both) at 95% confidence. We further checked if
simple multipliers were being applied to otherwise genuine
data, but no sequences of any length had values which were
all divisible by any prime less than 50.
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We conclude that if booters were generating fake data
to feed their live attack counters, they would have to have
considerable statistical acumen to reproduce the distributions
we observe. Of course we cannot completely rule out forgery
by booter operators with a deep knowledge of statistics,
but this does not seem especially likely. Furthermore, the
booter self-reported dataset shows moderate correlation with
our own reflected attack dataset (a correlation coefficient
of 0.47) and, most importantly, shows large drops in attack
numbers in the same places and for the same durations as the
significant drops we observe in our attack time series, which
we believe to correspond to law enforcement interventions.
This second dataset can also be used to determine when
booters first appear, how many booters are taken down each
week, and how many subsequently reappear. Unfortunately,
the ‘birth’ data is irredeemably biased by the data collec-
tion process in that new booters were only searched for
at somewhat irregular intervals. However, the ‘death’ and
‘resurrection’ data can be usefully analysed to determine if
interventions affect users (they choose to do fewer attacks) or
booter operators (they choose to enter or leave the market).
4 MODELLING THE DATA
It’s extremely difficult to measure directly the effect on
crime of law enforcement interventions. Empirical associa-
tions, causal effects, and the presence of extraneous variables
are all hard to quantify, and thus mechanisms are hard to
demonstrate through ‘true experiments’. In a forthcoming
paper, we attempt to trace some of these mechanisms em-
pirically through mixed-methods qualitative work, however
here we focus on an in-depth quantitative approach. Where
practical or ethical issues make it impossible to carry out
classic experiments with treatment and control groups and
randomisation (as in this case), it is well-established within
criminology and the social sciences that quasi-experimental
designs are an appropriate way of making tentative claims
about the effects of particular interventions [6][52][3].
Where large-scale interventions are attempted which af-
fect entire populations, establishing a suitable control group
can be impossible. We adopt what Cook and Campbell [10]
classify as a time series design, now often referred to as an
interrupted time series approach. This is appropriate where
data takes the form of a time series of observations, with inter-
ventions occurring at specific points in time, assumed to have
an immediate effect, with a clear pre-intervention functional
form, a suitable number of pre-intervention observations, and
a reasonable assumption that no unaccounted-for variable
is responsible for the change in the time series. Denial of
service attacks constitute event count data, which often have
skewed outcomes in practice, and our time series is indeed
non-normalised in distribution. Therefore, a maximum likeli-
hood estimation approach, rather than an ARIMA approach
(which relies on normally-distributed data), is indicated. We
use a negative binomial rather than poisson regression model,
as the events (denial of service attacks) are not independent,
rather there is a simple trend to the data [50][4][11]. We
restricted our modelling to the period June 2016 to April
2019 as there is a clear and fairly constant linear trend over
this period. Weekly totals were used as daily attack counts
showed a high degree of volatility.
Negative binomial regression is a established technique for
modelling count data, and can account for seasonal patterns
and non-stochastic slope components [19]. It is well-suited
to intervention analysis, and has been used to measure the
effects of interventions on criminal offending [5, 60].
Our aim was to analyse the effects of different interven-
tions on the booter market, once seasonal variation and the
underlying trend of the data were accounted for, fitting for
optimum log-pseudolikelihood. Thus for all periods in the
time series which drop significantly below the modelled series,
we added dummy ‘intervention’ variables to model the effect
sizes of these disruptions. We found five such interventions
that were statistically significant and one of the key con-
clusions of this paper is they correspond closely to events
discussed in §2 above.
The model parameters are displayed in Table 1 and Figure 2
shows the correspondence between the model and measured
attacks. We model seasonality over twelve one-month periods,
for which we need eleven seasonal variables in the model. We
included a component in the model to account for the chang-
ing date of Easter in the seasonal analysis, as the patterns
of booting are strongly linked to school holidays. We found
no evidence of multicollinearity in the regression components
used. Statistical data about the interventions is shown in
Table 2. We not only present the overall impact (in the final
column) but also whether these interventions are significant
when we apply the overall model solely to the attacks against
particular countries.
The intervention with the biggest impact (at a 95% con-
fidence level) was the FBI’s Xmas2018 intervention which
lasted for 10 weeks, during which there was a reduction of
between 37% and 27% in overall recorded attacks. However,
in some countries the effect lasted for only three weeks, and
for France the impact was not statistically significant. The
shutdown of HackForums’ SST section (§2.3) was also long-
lived with the market being suppressed for 13 weeks and for
longer in some countries.
The other interventions can be seen to result in smaller
but still significant (in most countries) drops in attack num-
bers. The reporting of high-profile court cases and sentencing
corresponds with short, immediate drops in attack numbers.
For takedowns, the effect is delayed, with the Webstresser
takedown (§2.5) taking effect after a fortnight and lasting 3
weeks. This may be because the totals are distorted by at-
tacks directed at the Netherlands which went up by 146% (i.e.
more than doubled), presumably caused by reprisal attacks
against the Dutch police who had spearheaded the operation.
4.1 Analysing by country
Having seen how the various interventions affected countries
differently we now take a step back and ask to what extent
countries have seen similar patterns of growth in attacks.
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95% CI
Date Coef. Std.error 𝑧 𝑃 > |𝑧| Lower Upper
Xmas2018 19/12/2018 −0.393 0.039 −10.05 0.000** −0.469 −0.316
Webstresser 24/04/2018 −0.238 0.0574 −4.15 0.000** −0.351 −0.126
Mirai sentencing and arrests 26/10/2018 −0.516 0.049 −10.46 0.000** −0.613 −0.420
HackForums SST forum closed 28/10/2016 −0.360 0.039 −9.16 0.000** −0.437 −0.283
vDOS sentencing 19/12/2017 −0.275 0.057 −4.83 0.000** −0.387 −0.164
Easter −0.016 0.094 −0.17 0.864 −0.200 0.168
seasonal_2 0.076 0.066 1.15 0.25 −0.053 0.205
seasonal_3 −0.051 0.060 −0.86 0.390 −0.168 0.066
seasonal_4 −0.025 0.057 −0.44 0.660 −0.137 0.087
seasonal_5 −0.098 0.062 −1.59 0.110 −0.220 0.023
seasonal_6 −0.134 0.069 −1.95 0.050* −0.269 0.001
seasonal_7 −0.125 0.054 −2.32 0.020* −0.230 −0.019
seasonal_8 −0.078 0.060 −1.3 0.190 −0.196 0.040
seasonal_9 0.069 0.058 1.19 0.240 −0.045 0.184
seasonal_10 −0.086 0.048 −1.77 0.080 −0.181 0.009
seasonal_11 −0.111 0.051 −2.16 0.030* −0.211 −0.010
seasonal_12 0.091 0.047 1.93 0.050 −0.001 0.182
time 0.010 0.000 27.04 0.000** 0.009 0.011
_cons 10.289 0.060 170.88 0.000** 10.171 10.407
Table 1: Negative binomial regression model showing model composition, including key interventions, seasonal
components, first order trend, and constant with significance and effect size. Asterisks indicate if inclusion
of an intervention made a significant (*) or strongly significant (**) contribution to the model. The seasonal
variables model the month-by-month seasonality of the data. We also included a separate component for
Easter as school holidays are linked to rises in attacks and the date of Easter is not fixed.
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Intervention UK US RU FR DE PL NL Overall
Xmas2018
Intervention
19/12/2018
Mean -27% -49% -33% -1% -28% -23% -16% -32%
L95/U95 -43/-28% -55/-42% -43/-22% -13/11% -36/-20% -37/-5% -27/-3% -37/-27%
Duration 9 weeks 9 weeks 9 weeks N/A 8 weeks 3 weeks 8 weeks 10 weeks
Signif. 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.828 0.000** 0.014* 0.018* 0.000**
Mirai sentencing
and other actions
24/10/2018
Mean -27% -31% -5% -9% -32% -47% -19% -40%
L95/U95 -42/-9% -41-20% -16/7% -31/21% -40/-23% -56/-36% -35/0% -46/-34%
Duration 2 weeks 7 weeks 2 weeks N/A 6 weeks 2 weeks 6 weeks 8 weeks
Signif. 0.006** 0.000** 0.41 0.533 0.000** 0.000** 0.053 0.000**
Webstresser
takedown
24/04/2018
Mean -10% -24% -16% -22% -29% -29% 146% -21%
L95/U95 -21%/3% -40/-4% -33/6% -35/-7% -36/-22% -42/-14% 94/211% -30/-12%
Duration N/A 4 weeks 2 weeks 4 weeks 9 weeks 6 weeks 4 weeks 3 weeks
Signif. 0.120 0.022* 0.14 0.006* 0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000**
vDOS
sentencing
16/12/2017
Mean -20% -4% -37% -30% -4% 16% -24% -24%
L95/U95 -33/-5% -18/12% -47/-24% -37/-23% -17/10% -17/62% -33/-13% -32/-25%
Duration 3 weeks 3 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks N/A N/A 3 weeks 3 weeks
Signif. 0.011* 0.563 0.000** 0.000** 0.532 0.373 0.000* 0.000**
HackForums
28/10/2016
Mean -48% -30% -13% -52% -32% 2% -35% -30%
L95/U95 -53/-42% -37/-21% -23/-3% -59/-43% -41/-23% -19/28% -42/-27% -33/-25%
Duration 15 weeks 7 weeks 14 weeks 15 weeks 7 weeks N/A 15 weeks 13 weeks
Signif. 0.000** 0.000** 0.02* 0.000** 0.000* 0.86 0.000* 0.000**
Table 2: Estimated effect sizes of statistically significant (at the global scale) interventions by country, showing
the effects of each intervention component in separate negative binomial models of attack numbers over time
in each country. Effects in red cells are not significant and the green cells are a significant increase rather than
decrease. Asterisks indicate inclusion of intervention in the model made a significant (*) or strongly significant
(**) contribution to the model. Countries were chosen by prominence in number of attacks, or factors which
made them of interest (such as NL retaliation for Webstresser takedown)
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Figure 3: Stacked area graph showing total attack numbers split by country of victim – top 8 countries by
number of attacks.
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Feb-15 Feb-16 Feb-17 Feb-18 Feb-19
US 45% 25% 31% 45% 47%
FR 11% 19% 8% 5% 10%
DE 9% 6% 5% 5% 6%
CN 8% 16% 55% 12% 7%
UK 7% 6% 4% 7% 8%
PL 3% 3% 1% 3% 9%
RU 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%
NL 3% 3% 2% 2% 3%
Total 88% 81% 108% 82% 92%
Table 3: Share of attacks by country of victim over
time (includes double-counting when attacks are at-
tributed to more than one country).
Although DoS attacks can be directed anywhere and be
for any purpose, prior studies have shown that most attacks
are on end-users (assumed to be games players) and on
gaming related websites [7, 48]. Sharma showed that timezone
determines when peak attacks occur [57] and we take the
view that there will be a significant correlation between the
country of the attacker and the country of the victim.
Table 3 sets out the eight countries which receive the high-
est number of DoS attacks and their percentage share over
the past five years. The US now accounts for the largest
number of UDP reflection attacks which we observe – 47%.
Note that this table, and the time series in Figure 3 in-
clude some double-counting as an artefact of how attacks are
conservatively assigned to countries.
There is strong correlation between the attack time series
for the UK, US, France, Germany and Poland (see Figure 4).
These countries all show a flat series until the beginning of
2017, then steady growth across 2017 and 2018 with a strong
seasonal pattern. The Netherlands is fairly similar, with a
slightly lower degree of correlation. Russia is lower still, with
less growth over time and smaller effects from interventions
(though still showing a reasonable degree of correlation with
the other series). China stands apart, showing no correlation
to the other nations or impact from interventions, with a
largely flat pattern over time and this lack of similarity led
us to exclude it from the analysis we presented in Table 2.
In the US, France, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, and
Poland, we observe a continuing upward trend from the
beginning of 2017 up to the Webstresser takedown in April
2018. In the UK, however, this upward trend flattened off
entirely from December 2017 until June 2018. This flat trend
continues until August, whereupon there was a large spike in
attacks and the series begins to grow again.
In Table 2, we present a comparison of the effects of
the different interventions we observe as significant at the
global level in individual countries. We selected seven nations
which had both large numbers of booter attacks and whose
booter markets we believed might credibly be expected to
experience disruption as a result of these interventions. We
ran negative binomial models (as described for the overall
attack series) for the series of attacks over time for each of
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Figure 4: Correlation between numbers of attacks
over time between countries, where 1 indicates com-
plete correlation, 0 indicates no correlation, and -1
indicates negative correlation.
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Figure 5: US and UK attack counts comparison.
Non-stacked graph with totals scaled so both start at
100 in June 2016, with 200 representing a doubling.
The NCA advertising intervention period which af-
fects the UK data is highlighted in grey.
these nations, enabling us to judge whether significant effects
could be observed in different nations, and to compare the
size of these effects. Where the per-country data showed large
spikes localised around particular events (such as retaliation
against the Dutch police for the Webstresser arrests), these
were included as a component in the model. For reasons
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of space, we do not present the details of the individual
per-country model parameters. The variation in effect sizes
between nations provide important evidence for a causal link
between interventions and the drops in attack numbers we
observe – for example, the Webstresser arrests show strong
negative effects in the US and Europe, but not in Russia
(as might be expected given their approach to extradition),
and correspond to a statistically significant increase in attack
numbers in the Netherlands (which we believe to be due to
reprisals against the Dutch police who led the action). France
is not significantly affected by a number of the interventions,
possibly accounted for by the existence of a large Francophone
booter market (where other European nations tend to use
English-language services) which may insulate it from news
reporting of major sentencing decisions and takedowns.
Figure 5 shows the figures for the US and the UK and
highlights the period during which the NCA were purchasing
search adverts (§2.7). As can be seen there is a strong case to
be made that the adverts, which were only displayed within
the UK, have caused a reduction in the number of attacks
on UK IP addresses. For comparison, the UK and US linear
trends from the period Jan 2017 until Dec 2017 had slopes
of 3.2 and 5.3 respectively, while for the period of the NCA
intervention, the US has a linear trend with a slope of 6.8,
while the UK trend has reduced to a nearly-flat slope of
-0.1. We believe that the adverts have led to a clear and
lasting reduction in the number of attacks. The US and UK
have a shared language and culture around booting with
participants often sharing similar online communities and so
correlation between growth rates would be expected. Attacks
on the UK are considerably lower in number (around 16%
as many per day on average) than attacks on the US, so
a suppression in UK growth due to the NCA intervention
would be unlikely to impact US growth even if UK targets
are hosted in the US.
4.2 Analysing by UDP protocol
Breaking attacks down by the UDP protocol used shows a
number of underlying patterns (Figure 6). Protocols appear
to go in and out of vogue at different times and there are short
term spikes. From analysis of booter attack logs we know
that booters experiment with switching to different protocols,
or perhaps choose not to reflect packets off the honeypots
providing our dataset [61], which may explain these spikes.
The steady rise in attack numbers from the beginning of
2017 to the end of 2018 appears to be largely driven by an
increase in attacks using the LDAP protocol which is the
only protocol with consistent growth over time. It has a large
amplification factor which has driven its popularity, but there
are not many real LDAP reflectors and so the honeypots are
likely to be used and continue to be used, so the data will be
very representative of overall traffic.
Many of the drops in attacks seen after interventions are
caused by drops in attacks for a particular protocol. This is
most likely due to the protocol only being used by a particular
booter. For the Webstresser takedown, we observe a small
drop in LDAP and a large drop in DNS. Some protocols are
perceived by users to be ‘best’ to use at that time, so the drop
seen following the shutdown of the HackForums SST section
was largely in the CHARGEN and NTP protocols, whereas
for the Xmas2018 intervention, the drop appears to largely
occur in the LDAP protocol, and to a lesser extent, DNS.
The recovery following this latter intervention sees increases
in DNS, LDAP and NTP attacks.
While in other countries the rise in LDAP largely drives
the overall upward trend across 2017 and 2018, in China this
is not the case, with LDAP largely replacing NTP attacks,
and the overall number of attacks remaining static. The rise
in LDAP takes place six months later in China than in the
rest of the world – near the end of 2017, rather than near the
beginning. Attacks against China use a much smaller range
of protocols than against the US, largely focusing on NTP
and SSDP, with LDAP increasingly prominent since the start
of 2018. The US, conversely, additionally sees substantial use
of DNS and PORTMAP (and, historically, CHARGEN). We
hypothesise that this is because the ‘Great Firewall of China’
blocks DNS traffic. Attacks targeting the UK appear to be
almost entirely LDAP since mid-2017.
4.3 Self-reported booter dataset
The self-reported attack data is shown in Figure 7. The data
is unlabelled because there are 150 different booters involved,
some of which are still active. We see a generally increas-
ing level of attacks over time, with clear changes following
particular interventions. Booters, especially those of medium
size, tend to be fairly unstable, and the data reflects this,
with outages clearly visible throughout. The effects of these
outages often appear to be ‘absorbed’ by displacement to
other booters (as seen in March 2018), so the overall attack
numbers remain steady overall.
In Figure 8 we plot the number of booters leaving (‘deaths’)
or re-entering (‘resurrections’) the market each week. The
spikes in new booters (‘births’) are an artefact of the data
collection process (aperiodic searches for new booters) and
we do not analyse those. Most weeks there is little change,
with two exceptions.
Webstresser was taken down in April 2018 (§2.5)2 and we
believe this disrupted a number of smaller booters that had
subcontracted their attacks to it and thus we see a spike in
‘deaths’. The attack data shows that the two biggest booters
are largely unaffected (though decreases in their attacks show
that there is some discouragement of users), and after a
couple of weeks new booters begin to appear.
The effects of the Xmas2018 intervention (§2.6) are highly
visible in the data and again there is a spike in ‘deaths’. There
is an initial large drop in attack numbers, which builds back
up slightly to a plateau of reduced attack numbers (relative
to the pre-intervention trend), which lasts until March. Prior
2Webstresser did not self-report attack numbers, so is not included
in Figure 7. Analysis of partial attack logs from Webstresser indicate
that it was of a similar size to the largest current booter before it
was taken down. Unfortunately, this data is not comparable with the
self-reported data due to its incompleteness and so is not presented.
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Figure 6: Stacked area graph of total attacks per week over time, split by protocol used by attacker. Most of
the growth comes from LDAP.
to the intervention, the market was distributed between
three major players and numerous smaller providers. The
intervention closes two of the three with the remaining one
maintaining a substantial share (about 60%) of an eventually
recovering market. Some of the smaller booters benefit from
this displacement as well, but not to the same extent.
Immediately after the intervention some short-lived booters
enter the market, then leave after a few weeks. More new
booters start appearing after a month, but with little impact
on the overall total number of attacks, so it appears that
the publicity has dissuaded users from attacking, or they
cannot locate working booters, or a search leads them to visit
one of the domains seized by the FBI and the splash page
has dissuaded them from further action. Growth in attack
numbers does not occur until March when one of the booters
taken down in December returns under a similar name.
Note that following the Xmas2018 intervention, while the
UDP reflection data shows a general flattening of the previ-
ously rising trend, the self-reported data continues to grow
from March 2019 onwards. From our separate qualitative
research on booter communities, we believe that this is a
move away from UDP reflection attacks to using botnets that
send traffic directly, often as Layer 7 (TCP) attacks.
5 RELATED WORK
The closest work to this is the simultaneously published paper
by Kopp et al. which uses IXP and ISP flow data to study
the Xmas2018 intervention by the FBI [29]. They also found
that there was reduction in attacks as a result, but found it
to be smaller, possibly because they only model attacks over
the period Oct 2018 to Jan 2019, thereby ignoring seasonal
effects.
Analysis of booter databases began with Karami and Mc-
Coy’s analysis of twBooter [27], then Santanna et al. analysed
databases from 15 booters [53]. Karami et al. [28] evaluated
the disruptive effects of PayPal shutting down accounts linked
with booters. They found that despite operators changing
to accept bitcoin payments, the intervention had a negative
effect on revenue. Brunt et al. [7] followed this up by scraping
the vDOS website and analysing its dumped database to
show that only 11% of the customers who had previously paid
by PayPal switched to Bitcoin. However, vDOS probably still
remained profitable until the operators were arrested [30].
The other major strategy for measuring booter attacks is
using UDP honeypots such as the hopscotch [61] or Amp-
Pot [41]. Noroozian et al. [48] used AmpPot and analysed the
victims of DDoS finding that most were on access networks.
In contrast Jonker et al. [25] combined AmpPot data with
UCSD’s network telescope and found that most DoS attacks
were on web servers. Several research groups have bought
attacks from booters in order to analyse the attacks [29].
Santanna et al. analysed attacks from 14 booters [55]. Krupp
et al. [40] were able to use purchased attacks to link other
attacks to individual booter services with a precision of 99%
and recall of 69% using a 𝑘-NN classifier using the set of
honeypots used in the attack, the TTL values, and the victim
port entropy. Krupp et al. [39] used a different approach for
attribution and used selective reply from AmpPot honeypots
to give scanners a fingerprint which enabled them to attribute
58% of attacks to a scanner IP with 99.9% certainty.
Dupont [15] examines attempts to deal with botnets and
identifies three main categories of response: incapacitation,
disruption and harm reduction. More widely, current law
enforcement approaches to online crime focus on disrupting
markets through investigation and high-profile prosecution of
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Figure 8: Number of booters entering and leaving the market per week. “Deaths” (booters not responding)
and “resurrections” (running again after a death) are recorded weekly for all booters which we are aware of.
“Births” relate to intermittent sweeps to detect new booters being set up and should be viewed cautiously.
prominent ‘key players’, aided by intelligence gathering and
standard policing approaches such as cultivating informants
and infiltration [24].
Criminological studies have analysed the effects of police
crackdowns on online drug markets. These ‘crackdowns’ are
time-limited intensive law enforcement efforts which aim at
deterrence. The assumption is that increasing the likelihood
and severity of punishment will increase the perceived risk of
operating in these markets. This increased risk should raise
the cost of the end product, reduce consumption, and lead to
the exit of key market players [51]. However, the literature
suggests that the effect of these interventions is limited, with
drug markets showing more resilience than would be expected
if their members’ participation were determined on a purely
calculative, economic basis [12]. In addition to ‘crackdowns’,
there are a range of additional law enforcement strategies for
tackling online marketplaces [24], but there is limited data
on the effectiveness of these strategies in practice.
Comparing the effects of different kinds of interventions in
the market for booter services suggests that it is particularly
susceptible to law enforcement action. Criminological work
on other online illicit markets shows that law enforcement
interventions are often limited in their effects. Décary-Hétu’s
research on drug cryptomarkets shows that the wide-ranging
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Operation Onymous police action was successful in reducing
numbers of active dealers, and to a smaller extent, consump-
tion of drugs, for around two months but there was no long-
term observable effect on trade in drug cryptomarkets [12].
The impact we see from the Xmas2018 intervention is longer
term and more pronounced. Also, we believe that the struc-
ture of the booter market has been changed with a single
booter now predominating. Research by Ladegaard shows
that, contrary to our findings for booter services, high-profile
sentencing judgements actually appear to increase revenue for
drug cryptomarkets [42]. This accords with a long history of
criminological research which suggests that harsh sentencing
has little deterrent effect on crime [42]. This may indicate
that involvement in the booter market is influenced by rather
different factors than involvement in drug cryptomarkets.
Our use of time series data to evaluate the effects of in-
terventions intended to reduce crime has a long history. For
example, Dugan et al. [14] use this approach to evaluate
the effects of a range of interventions designed to reduce
aeroplane hijackings from 1931 to 2003. They found the
introduction of metal detectors and increased enforcement
significantly reduced hijackings, while tighter baggage and
customer screening did not.
6 DISCUSSION
We are well-aware of flaws in the datasets that we have
used for our analysis. The datasets are incomplete, they
are very noisy and, as shown by the rise in attacks in the
Netherlands when everywhere else was seeing a decrease,
local effects can substantially affect global trends. However
our datasets are large and cover long periods of time and so
despite these limitations we believe they provide a reasonable
approximation to ‘ground truth’ about levels of attacks and
the effects which different interventions have on them.
We are also cautious in making claims about cause and
effect. While we have been able to locate interventions or
disruptions which correspond to major drops in the time
series of attacks, they may actually be due to factors of
which we are unaware.
That said, we see that there is consistency between the
type of intervention and the effect it produces both globally
and at a country level. We now discuss this by considering
the different types of intervention and the extent to which
they produce three primary outcomes – dissuading providers
(reducing supply), dissuading users (reducing demand), and
producing structural changes to the market.
6.1 High-profile court cases
Media coverage of the prosecution or sentencing of booter
providers appears to have no consistent effect on the num-
ber of attacks we observe. The reporting of the two Mirai
court cases shows a clear and significant reduction in attack
numbers but with a substantial variation between different
countries, presumably because events in foreign countries are
seen as less salient than those closer to home. Additionally,
these took place at a time during which other events were
occuring which may have disrupted the market for booter
services. We argue that this indicates that the reporting of
booter sentences has no consistent negative effect on attacks.
Given that these are not linked to increased shutdowns of
booter services, we argue that any effect we do observe is to
reduce the demand for attacks from users.
6.2 Taking down individual booters
The Webstresser takedown had a deep but short-term effect
on the market for booter services. Webstresser was the biggest
booter at the time of its shutdown, but there was only limited
structural change to the market. A number of smaller booters
disappeared, but they made little contribution to overall
attack totals. There was a short-term drop in attacks by
medium-sized providers, but mainly in mainland Europe and
the US. Although there may have been a deterrent effect, the
reduction may in fact be due to reselling, and Webstresser
may have been providing the actual attack infrastructure
and other booters were merely a shop-front. There was no
lasting effect on the overall trend of attack numbers or the
structure of the market, and the market had recovered to
previous levels after a few weeks.
6.3 Wide-ranging interventions
Compared to the limited effects of the takedown of Web-
stresser, more wide-ranging takedowns had a much longer-
lasting effect effect. The Xmas2018 intervention was by some
margin the most effective, preceding a 10 week decrease of
27% to 37% fewer attacks than would be expected. The shut-
down of the SST section of HackForums led to a shallower
effect, but one which lasted for 13 weeks. We view this as a
form of ‘takedown’ because it was the closure of a series of
shop-fronts for booters which directly affected how easy it
was to find a booter. It also removed a space for discussions
where users could compare the effectiveness of booters, share
practices and generally reinforce the booter culture.
We believe these wide-ranging takedowns affected the struc-
ture of the market, causing a number of booters to leave the
market permanently, along with a move away from multiple
mid-range providers towards a market dominated by a single
booter. We also see clear evidence of a suppression of user
demand for services, with lower overall numbers of attacks
for a sustained period.
6.4 Targeted messaging campaigns
The NCA’s search adverts campaign targeting potential
booter users in the UK appears to be correlated with a
striking change in the time series of UK attacks. Where
the other major booter-using nations continue their upward
trend, the UK deviates at this point, flattening throughout
the period of the campaign and only resuming an upward
trend a few months after it has ended. This suggests that
the campaign may have had the effect of dissuading new
users from becoming involved, halting the rising demand
for attacks for a period of seven or eight months. It further
suggests that the rise in attacks (at least in the UK) comes
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from increased demand for these services linked to new users
entering the market, rather than extra activity by existing
booter users.
6.5 Displacement and deterrence
While we can observe displacement to alternative booter
providers when takedowns occur, this is often time-limited
for smaller providers as the influx of users can overwhelm
them (ironically this can be seen as a ‘denial of service’) and
lead to their services stopping working effectively.
Although there is much commonality, we observe differ-
ences in the effect sizes of interventions between countries.
These may be language effects in that news fails to spread,
particularly to China. Additionally, Russia and France saw
no significant drop from the Xmas2018 event, suggesting that
their booter communities may have been using a different set
of providers. Conversely, the Webstresser takedown had an
effect across several countries, possibly because the market
was so concentrated around Webstresser. The current con-
centration of the market round a single booter means that
if it were to be taken down then we would expect to see an
international effect.
There is little evidence in the literature of any deterrent
effect of media reporting of sentencing for other kinds of
criminal online activity [42], so our findings for booting merit
further consideration. Equally, although adverts may not
affect the behaviour of those already involved in booting,
the NCA campaign appears to have halted the rise in DoS
attacks in the UK for as long as it was running.
We argue, given previous research on the booter commu-
nity [22], that this we have not observed a ‘classical’ deterrent
effect where interventions affect the risk calculus of actors
involved in crime. Instead, we believe that the effect is ex-
plained by cultural factors in the booter community, which is
particularly reliant on a widespread, persistent narrative that
booting is not serious crime, involves low levels of harm, and
is effectively legal. The effectiveness of the NCA campaign
implies that this narrative is a key factor for new users enter-
ing the booter market. We therefore argue, on the evidence
from the UK, that messaging campaigns could be a key part
of an effective strategy against booting.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This is the first academic research, of which we are aware,
to study the effects of police interventions on the market for
booter services and it is also one of the first evaluations of
cybercrime interventions more generally.
We have modelled the number of reflected UDP DoS at-
tacks using a negative binomial regression with intervention
components modelled where the series drops below that ex-
pected from the seasonally adjusted, upward trend. We then
linked these drops to widely reported intervention events:
discussion boards closing, shutting down booters and the
sentencing of booter operators.
We have used self-reported data of the number of attacks
carried out by individual booters to determine whether the
impact of interventions has been to cause booters to with-
draw from the market (voluntarily or otherwise) or to affect
the demand for their services. We find some evidence for
displacement – when one booter closes there is an uptick in
the attacks performed by others. This does however make
the market more ‘brittle’, meaning that the long term im-
pact of the Xmas2018 intervention may make any future
action against the booter which now has 60% of the market
especially disruptive.
The main impact we see is that interventions against boot-
ers can successfully cause a reduction in attack numbers. We
see a strong effect from the targeted messaging of the NCA
search adverts campaign in the UK which appeared to be
particularly effective at keeping new users out of the market.
The most successful interventions appear to be mass take-
downs – the Xmas2018 intervention saw the closure of large
numbers of booter sites, and the Hackforums intervention led
to the de-facto closure of several major shopfronts. Both these
interventions made it harder for users to find working booters.
Arrests (and subsequent sentencing) do have an effect, but
it is more short-lived. It is an open question whether arrests
are essential to reinforce the impact of a takedown, although
they should of course prevent the same booter operator just
starting up again the following day.
We argue that there are three mechanisms underlying
the effects we see in our data. Firstly, messaging campaigns
appear to suppress user demand for services by undermining
the widespread perception in the booter community that their
activity is low-harm and essentially legal. A further advantage
of messaging approaches is that they are relatively cheap, do
not pull people into the criminal justice system, and avoid the
criminogenic effects and harms of harsher enforcement action.
Secondly, there appears to be a destabilising effect of website
takedowns, which dissuade booter providers and reduce the
accessibility of these services. Finally, wide-ranging website
takedowns appear to have a structural effect on the market
for booter services, concentrating them around particular
providers (and potentially making them more susceptible to
further intervention).
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A ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The ethical case for the UDP reflection honeypots operated
by the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre is described in Thomas
et al. [61] and summarised below.
Reflecting UDP packets could assist criminals in perform-
ing DoS attacks. However the hopscotch reflector limits the
number of packets it reflects to any IP address. It attempts
to only reflect to the criminals’ scanners (so that they use the
honeypots) but not (at any scale) to victims. Furthermore,
when any hopscotch sensor identifies a victim this is reported
to a central server which informs all the other sensors of the
attack, so that they all refuse to reflect any packets at all to
the victim.
The result is that if the hopscotch sensors are used for
illegal attacks then after a very short period there will be
rather less traffic delivered to the victim than if the sensors
did not exist, because some of the attack traffic generated
by the criminal is being absorbed by the sensors rather than
going to real reflectors and being reflected and amplified.
‘White-hat’ scanners identify reflectors and report them to
the relevant ISP or hosting company who will then contact
the owner of the machine. The hopscotch sensors do not reply
to identified ‘white-hat’ scanners, or to known researchers,
in order to avoid wasting their time or affecting their results.
Data on self-reported attacks by booters was collected by
logging in to the booter websites as a visitor. No data was
collected that required buying a subscription or requesting
an attack before data would be displayed.
Both datasets can be obtained by academic researchers
from the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre so that other re-
searchers can fully reproduce or build upon our results.
https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk/process.html
In line with previous research in this space, we have not
published the identity of any booters which are still opera-
tional at the time of publication.
The ethical issues in the use of leaked or seized booter
databases to support our results is discussed by Thomas et
al. [61] and put in a broader context in a later paper on the
use of leaked data for research [62]. Only the attack logs were
analysed for this paper.
We followed our institution’s ethical review procedure
throughout. We carefully designed our experiments to op-
erate ethically and we had no human subjects. Our related
qualitative research which supported this work was approved
by our ethics committee (#621).
